INTRODUCTION
If we trust our intuitions, the last big European cycle of protest caused such fundamental changes in the social and political structures that we are still wondering about the kind of world we are now living in. In the eyes of a neutral observer, the democracy movements that shook Eastern Europe in 1989 were and, together with popular mobilizations in the Baltic Republics later on, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. That the movements must have played a significant role can be seen in the impressive growth of popular mobilizations in those countries. Take the example of East Germany. Oberschall (1996) reports an impressive increase in the number of participants in protests and demonstrations in Leipzig, where the key events took place during 1989. Whereas the celebration of the anniversary of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg on January 15 saw the presence of 150-200 participants, the protest marches from Nikolai church to the center, which (starting from October 16) took place every Monday until Christmas, mobilized from 110,000 to 450,000 people. Yet even the most relentless optimists would concede that, without major changes in the structures of power, the protests and mass demonstrations would hardly have had such dramatic consequences. In fact, one can argue that in the absence of such changes the movements themselves would not take on such a big scale. Two major transformations in the states' structures gave a big boost to the democracy movements in Easter Europe and helped them change our world: Gorbachev's perestroika and the cracks in the Communist states' alliance system. Movement mobilization and state breakdown combined in a complex way to bring about a revolutionary outcome. Another example: During the summer of 1995 the Dutch oil company Shell announced plans to destroy the Brent Spar offshore oil rig located in the North Sea because it became unusable. This decision provoked the immediate reaction by outraged environmentalist groups, especially Greenpeace, which foresaw an ecological disaster and called for a boycott of Shell products worldwide. Many consumers took the boycott seriously and the company's sales went down considerably in the days following the appeal. Particularly in Germany, drivers avoided Shell's gas stations in favor of other companies. Worried by the fall of sales and the bad public image it was receiving, the oil company abandoned the project of destroying the oil rig, thus conceding a significant victory to Greenpeace and the environmental movement.
This example is very different from the previous one. For one thing, the events were much more limited in time, space, and scope. While the revolutions in Eastern Europe lasted several months (indeed, a very short time for a revolution), involved thousands of participants, and had dramatic social and political repercussions for the entire world, the Greenpeace boycott was called by a single organization and was successful within a few weeks, but this certainly did not alter the foundations of contemporary society. Another difference is that Greenpeace activists had seemingly expected-or at least hoped-that Shell would withdraw from its decision, whereas no one could have foreseen the fundamental changes brought about by the opposition to the Communist regimes. Despite these differences, the two examples taken together illustrate several problems and difficulties inherent in the study of the consequences of social movements. The principal difficulty is how to establish a causal relationship between a series of events that we can reasonably classify as social movement actions and an observed change in society, be it minor or fundamental, durable or temporary. Both our examples display social movement activities and were followed by changes that the movements had asked for, although the scope of those changes, in one case, went well beyond any possible anticipation. But the problem of causal attribution remains the same. Even for the apparently more obvious effect in the Brent Spar case, we cannot a priori exclude the intervention of a third party (a member of the political elite, for example) which may have caused the withdrawal of Shell's decision. In addition, both the protest cycle for democracy and Greenpeace's call for a boycott might have had a series of long-term consequences that neither the populations of Eastern Europe nor Greenpeace activists had planned. As I hope it will become clear by the end of the paper, these methodological problems can only be resolved theoretically.
Social scientists often have a hard time finding consensus on many aspects of their collective enterprise. Students of social movements are certainly no exception to this rule. They often disagree on the causes of protest, its development over time, its fate, and the methods of analysis. Yet they all seem to agree that the study of the effects of social movements has largely been neglected, and it has become common sense to cite this state of affairs (e.g. Berkowitz 1974 , Gurr 1980 , Tarrow 1993 . Such neglect is quite astonishing, for the ultimate end of movements is to bring about change. The field, however, is not as empty as several observers have maintained.1 Nevertheless, we still lack systematic empirical analyses that would add to our knowledge of the conditions under which movements produce certain effects. Furthermore, a striking disparity exists between the large body of work on political and policy outcomes and the sporadic studies on the cultural and institutional effects of social movements. This review reflects this state of affairs.
(For previous reviews see Amenta et al 1992, Burstein et al 1995 , Gurr 1980 , Jenkins 1981 , Mirowsky & Ross 1981 , Schumaker 1978 I first address the two main axes of early research: the moderation/disruption 1The fact that, due to lack of space, I had to leave out a great many existing works is a clear indication that there is a large body of literature on movement consequences. I have provided a more exhaustive overview of the extant literature in another paper (Giugni 1994) , on which the present one is partly based. It should also be noted that studies of social revolutions, insofar as the latter are the product of social movements or coalitions between movements and oppositional elites, may be considered as the most dramatic effect of movements. Again, for space reasons I will not deal with this aspect. axis and the organization/disorder axis. Second, I review work that has attempted to put movements and their outcomes in their larger social and political context. Third, I point to some logical as well as methodological problems of existing work that have prevented the cumulative gathering of systematic knowledge. In the end, I hope to be able to show that, while there exists a considerable amount of work on this topic, little systematic research has been done. This is especially true when it comes to comparisons across countries and across movements to specify the conditions that foster certain types of impact, an approach that I view as one of the most promising avenues for future research.
THE POWER OF MOVEMENTS
Most research so far has focused on the intended effects of social movements.
Early work has looked in particular at the impact of movement-controlled variables by attempting to single out the characteristics of movements that are most conducive to success or, more generally, that help certain outcomes to occur. In this respect, one can discern two closely interrelated lines of investigation. The first line concerns the impact, mostly on policy, of various organizational variables and has brought researchers to ask whether strongly organized movements are more successful than loosely organized movements. The second line of inquiry has looked at the effects of disruptive and violent protest behavior and has opened a debate in the literature about whether the use of disruptive tactics by social movements is more likely to lead to policy changes than moderate tactics. This debate has largely dealt with the effectiveness of violence. Let us briefly discuss each of these two aspects.
The Impact of Organization
Resource mobilization theory has dominated the study of social movements and contentious politics for at least three decades. It is therefore little surprising that research on movement outcomes has paid a lot of attention to the role of the organizational characteristics of movements. There is a fair amount of theoretical and empirical work that links various movement-controlled variables to their alleged impact. While early theoretical work has speculated over the link between government responsiveness and the nature of movement demands, organizational size and stability, leadership, and strategies (e.g. Etzioni 1970 , Lipsky & Levi 1972 , other authors have tried to show it empirically. Brill's (1971) finding (based on a case study of rent strikes) that success is not likely to result if the movement leaders are unable to build an effective organization is typical in this respect. Relevant work includes Shorter & Tilly's (1974) examination of the effect of organizational variables on the outcomes of strikes in France, Staggenborg's (1988) inquiry into the consequences of professionalization and formalization in the pro-choice movement, and Clemens' (1993) investigation of the impact of organizational repertoires on institutional change. We also have a substantial body of literature on the effects of lobbying strategies on governmental decisions and congressional action (e.g. Fowler & Shaiko 1987 , Milbrath 1970 , Metz 1986 . However, these studies often are more concerned with interest-group politics than social movements themselves.
Important evidence about the relationship between various organizational variables and the success of social movements comes from Gamson's The Strategy of Social Protest (1990), which after more than two decades remains perhaps the most systematic attempt to inquire into the impact and effectiveness of social movements. The author's comprehensive analysis of the careers of 53 American challenging groups active between 1800 and 1945 led him to conclude that (a) groups with single-issue demands were more successful than groups with multiple-issue demands, (b) the use of selective incentives was positively correlated with success, (c) the use of violence and generally disruptive tactics was associated with success, while being the objects of violence made it more difficult (as we will see in more detail below) and (d) successful groups tended to be more bureaucratized, centralized, and unfactionalized, which is the most important point for the present purpose. Finally, he tested the role of context variables and found that times (quiet or turbulent) did not matter much, whereas political crises seemed to have an effect on the outcomes of the challenging groups examined.
Gamson's work has raised a number of criticisms, mostly methodological (Goldstone 1980 , Gurr 1980 , Snyder & Kelly 1976 , Webb et al 1983 , Zelditch 1978 , but also a series of reanalyses of his data, which the author had appended to the book (Frey et al 1992 , Goldstone 1980 , Mirowsky & Ross 1981 , Steedly & Foley 1979 .2 As in the case of the role of disruptive tactics, most of these works have confirmed Gamson's principal findings, at least in part. For example, Steedly & Foley (1979) , using more sophisticated techniques, found group success related, in order of relative importance, to the nondisplacement nature of the goals, the number of alliances, the absence of factionalism, the existence of specific and limited goals, and the willingness to use sanctions. Similarly, Mirowsky and Ross (1981) , aiming at finding the locus of control over movement success, found protester-controlled factors more important than the support of third parties or the situation for a successful outcome. Of these protester-controlled factors, the organization and, above all, the beliefs and goals were seen as crucial for success. More recently, Frey et al (1992) 2These reanalyses have been included in the book's second edition (Gamson 1990). pointed to the importance of not having displacement goals and group factionalism to obtain new advantages. Thus, Gamson's central argument stressing internal variables and resource mobilization as determinants of group success found further support. However, Piven and Cloward's (1979) thesis that movements have a chance to succeed to the extent that they avoid building a strong organization brought a fundamental criticism to Gamson's stress on the effectiveness of organization, a criticism that has triggered a debate in both scholarly and general audience journals. In addition, Goldstone's (1980) reanalysis of Gamson's data cast serious doubts over his findings and pointed to a perspective on social movement outcomes that takes into account their broader political context. Before I return to this aspect, I would like to discuss the second main axis of existing research: the impact of disruption.
The Effectiveness of Disruptive and Violent Protest
Overall, the use by social movements of disruptive tactics and violence seems to increase their potential for change. Several authors have argued that, contrary to the pluralist claim that moderation in politics is more effective than disruption, the use of force by social movements increases the chances that they reach their goals (Astin et al 1975 , McAdam 1983 , Tarrow 1994 , Tilly et al 1975 . Again, Gamson's (1990) study provides empirical evidence of the effectiveness of violence and the use of constraints. He found that the use of violence and, more generally, disruptive tactics by challenging groups was positively correlated to his two measures of success: the acceptance of challengers as legitimate claimants and the obtaining of new advantages for constituents. These findings are backed up by some of the aforementioned reanalyses of his data, in particular those by Mirowsky & Ross (1981) and Steedly & Foley (1979) . Yet there is no consensus on this point, nor on the implications of this for movements.
Much evidence on the relationship between disruptive or violent movement tactics and their impact comes from two important strands of research: the study of strikes and the many analyses of the wave of urban riots that occurred in several American cities at the end of the sixties. As far as strike activity is concerned, Taft & Ross (1969) , on the basis of a study of violent labor conflicts in the United States through 1968, found little evidence that violence would help unions to reach their goals. A similar conclusion has been reached by Snyder and Kelly (1976) . By analyzing quantitative data on strikes that occurred in Italy between 1878 and 1903, Snyder and Kelly were able to show that violent strikes were less successful than peaceful ones. These results contradict those obtained by Shorter & Tilly (1971) in their study of strikes in France, who found a positive correlation between the use of violence and strike outcomes. Research on strike activity, however, has gone beyond the specific question of disruption or violence to examine broader issues related to the in- (Cohn 1993 , Franzosi 1994 , Hicks & Swank 1984 , Swank 1983 , Shorter & Tilly 1974 , Snyder & Kelly 1976 ). The effectiveness of disruptive protest and movements has been analyzed thoroughly in the aftermath of the urban riots of the 1960s in the United States (for reviews see Gurr 1980 , Isaac & Kelly 1981 , Piven & Cloward 1993 . To be sure, rioting behavior and social movements are not equivalent, though they are both instances of contentious politics, defined as "collective activity on the part of claimants-or those who claim to represent them-relying at least in part on noninstitutionalized forms of interaction with elites, opponents, or the state" (Tarrow 1996:874) . Social movements, on the other hand, may be defined as "sustained challenges to powerholders in the name of a disadvantaged population living under the jurisdiction or influence of those powerholders" (Tarrow 1996:874 ; see also Tarrow 1994 , Tilly 1984 . However, studying riots can yield important insights on the effectiveness of disruption and violent protest by social movements. In addition, the American riots of the sixties have sparked the interest on the latter aspect among students of social movements. Some authors, including Hahn (1970 ), McClurg Mueller (1978 , Isaac & Kelly (1981) , Kelly & Snyder (1980) , and Sears & McConahay (1973) , have focused explicitly on the effects of violence. In general, the evidence gathered does not allow for a definitive answer to the question whether rioting is beneficial or detrimental to the population involved. Kelly & Snyder (1980) , for example, suggested that there is no causal relationship between the frequency and severity of violence displayed in American cities during the 1960s and the distribution of black socioeconomic gains at the local level, either by income level or by employment and occupational changes. Feagin & Hahn (1973) , in a monograph on ghetto riots, maintain that the latter led at best to limited reform and mostly to changes in police policies. Nevertheless, the authors did not provide systematic evidence for their argument. Berkowitz (1974) , who looked at socioeconomic changes at the neighborhood level brought about by ghetto riots between 1960 and 1970, found no differential improvement for riot tracts, arguing against a positive effect of the riots (see also Levitan et al 1975) . Even more pessimistically, Welch (1975) showed that the riots led to an increase in urban expenditures for control and punishment of rioters, and much less in their favor. However, Colby's (1975) findings in a way contradict Welch's, because he found that the riots had a positive influence on redistribution policy, though no influence on regulatory policy at the state level. On the other hand, Jennings (1979) , also through a comparison of states but over time as well, found some support for a positive correlation between the number of riots and the increase in AFDC recipients. Many studies of the urban riots in American cities are directly related to Piven & Cloward's (1993) well-known thesis about the regulating functions of public welfare (for reviews see Piven & Cloward 1993 , Trattner 1983 . As it is known, these authors provocatively argued that welfare systems serve two principal functions: to maintain a supply of low-wage labor and to restore order in periods of civil turmoil. According to this thesis, hence, turmoil and disruptive actions do provoke policy change, but this can hardly be seen as success, for such concessions are usually withdrawn once the turmoil subsides. A series of studies carried out during the 1970s and 1980s attempted to reexamine this thesis (e.g. Albritton 1979 , Betz 1974 , Colby 1982 , Hicks & Swank 1983 , Isaac & Kelly 1981 , Jennings 1979 , 1980 , Schramm & Turbott 1983 , Sharp & Maynard-Moody 1991 . In addition, other authors have addressed Piven and Cloward's argument, but focusing on the relief expansion of the thirties (e.g. Jenkins & Brents 1989 , Kerbo & Shaffer 1992 ; see further Valocchi 1990 ). Again, although much of the disagreement with Piven and Cloward's thesis bears not so much on the results in themselves, but rather their interpretation, in the whole it is difficult out of this impressive amount of empirical work to provide a clear-cut answer to the question whether disruption can produce policy changes and, if so, what this means for the movements.
Such uncertainty of results calls for a conditional analysis that singles out the circumstances under which violence matters. This task was accomplished by Button (1978) , among others, in one of the most comprehensive empirical studies of the political impact of the 1960s riots. He maintained that violence is conducive to political and social change under five general conditions: 1. when powerholders have enough public resources to meet the demands of the movement, 2. when violent actions and events are neither too frequent as to cause massive societal and political instability nor severe enough to be noticed and to represent a threat, 3. when a relevant share of powerholders and the public are sympathetic to the goals of the movement and the violence is not so severe as to undermine this sympathy, 4. when the aims and demands of the movement are relatively limited, specific, and clear, and 5. when violence is adopted in combination with peaceful and conventional strategies (Button 1978) . Button's approach has the advantage of avoiding the formulation of a too-simple causal relationship between the use of violence and its outcomes. On the other hand, it seems so broad as to run the risk of leading to trivial results. A narrower argument in this respect has been put forth by Schumaker (1978) , who has looked at the conditions under which disruptive tactics work. His results suggest that the use of constraints is more effective when the conflict is limited to the protest group and their target (i.e. when the scope of conflict is narrow).
In contrast, when the public becomes involved in the conflict (i.e. when the scope of conflict is broad), the use of constraints tends to reduce the chances of a successful outcome. Other analyses based on the 1960s urban riots, however, suggest that militancy is generally not conducive to success (Schumaker 1975) . Similarly, a study of official responses to 60 protest incidents that occurred in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand between 1960 and 1977 showed that the use of violent constraints (i.e. militancy), except when the group of protesters was large, had negative effects on the protest's outcomes because repression was more likely to occur (O'Keefe & Schumaker 1983 ).
MOVEMENT OUTCOMES IN CONTEXT
To summarize the paper so far, existing research on the impact of several internal characteristics of social movements, such as the use of disruptive tactics and actions, seems to yield contradictory findings. Nevertheless, this contradiction may well be more apparent than real. The puzzle may be solved once we acknowledge the crucial role of the broader political context in facilitating or constraining both the mobilization and the potential outcomes of movements. Strategies that work in a given context may simply be ineffective in other political settings and vice versa. Thus, more recent work has shifted away from the study of the effectiveness of disruption and the organizational characteristics of social movements toward the environmental conditions that channel their consequences. This has been done in two distinct directions. First, the role of public opinion in facilitating or preventing movements to make an impact has been thoroughly investigated, particularly in the United States. A major turn in the study of movement outcomes, however, has secondly come from comparative analyses that attempt to link them to the movements' political context. Next I briefly consider these two avenues of research.
Public Opinion
Social movements, particularly when they express themselves through their most typical form of action, public demonstrations, address their message simultaneously to two distinct targets: the powerholders and the general public. On the one hand, they press the political authorities for recognition as well as to get their demands met, at least in part. On the other hand, they seek public support and try to sensitize the population to their cause. At the same time, the most common political targets of contemporary movements, namely local or national governments, pay particular attention to public opinion and fluctuations therein. All this makes a strong case for taking public opinion into account as an important external factor in the study of the outcomes of social movements. This has been done above all in the United States. Public opinion has entered the study of movement outcomes both as explanatory variable and explanandum. In the former case, one examines how and to what extent movements produce changes in the perceptions people have of a given issue (e.g. Gusfield 1981 , Lawson 1976 , Oberschall 1973 , Orfield 1975 . However, while it seems rather obvious that protest activities raise the awareness of the population over certain political issues, changes in public opinion can also help movements to reach their goals by making decision-makers more responsive to their demands. Hence, several authors have stressed the role of public opinion for legislative change (e.g. Burstein 1979a -c, 1985 , Burstein & Freudenburg 1978 , Costain & Majstorovic 1994 , Page & Shapiro 1983 , Weissberg 1976 ), though not always related to the impact of social movements.
Paul Burstein is certainly among those who have paid most attention to this aspect. In his analysis of the struggle for equal employment opportunity in the United States, he showed that "equal employment opportunity legislation was adopted as the result of social changes that were manifested in public opinion, crystallized in the civil rights and women's movements, and transformed into public policy by political leaders" (Burstein 1985:125) , thus pointing to the interconnections of public opinion, movement activities, and congressional action in bringing about policy changes for discriminated-against groups. In similar fashion, Costain and Majstorovic (1994) studied the multiple origins of women's rights legislation by stressing the same three sets of factors. As they argue, there are several views of the relationship between public opinion and legislative action. They see four prevailing interpretations: 1. a public opinion interpretation, stating a direct relationship between public opinion and legislative change, 2. an interpretation that sees public opinion as filtering the impact of outside events on legislative action, 3. an elite behavior interpretation, according to which public opinion is affected by legislative elites, and 4. a social movement interpretation, whereby legislation results from the joint action of social movements, public opinion, and media coverage. The latter appears as the most plausible interpretation, for not only does it take into account both movement actions and changes in public opinion, but it also acknowledges the fundamental role of the media for movement mobilization and outcomes. The way in which the media cover, frame, and interpret social movements has largely been neglected in the existing literature. Together with the analysis of the role of political opportunty structures for movement outcomes, this is a promising avenue for future research (e.g. Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993) .
Political Opportunity Structures
As our initial example about the fall of the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe illustrates, and as Goldstone's (1980) reanalysis of Gamson's data made clear, the study of the outcomes of social movements cannot avoid taking into account the political context in which they operate. On the basis of a series of methodological criticisms, Goldstone challenged both Gamson's main conclusions and his basic theoretical tenet. He found that the organizational and tactical characteristics had no effect on group success. The timing of success, he maintained, is independent of the challengers' organization and tactics. What is most important, he suggested, is that the resource mobilization model be replaced by a model that stresses the crucial role of broad, systemwide national crises for the success of social movements. We have a name for it: the political-process model. By looking at how external political factors affect protest behavior, this approach also stresses the importance of the movements' larger environment for their outcomes (e.g. Kitschelt 1986 , McAdam 1982 , Rochon & Mazmanian 1993 , Tarrow 1994 ). This, I think, is a clear theoretical advance and a way to follow.
The central concept in the political process model is that of political opportunity structure. In spite of various conceptualizations, two aspects appear to be crucial for the understanding of the relation between social movements and their political environment: the system of alliances and oppositions and the structure of the state. The importance of having powerful allies both within and without the institutional arena has been stressed on several occasions. Early work focused in particular on the context of social support and conceived of alliances as a political resource that movements can use to become more successful, since movements were considered as powerless challengers. One of the first systematic statements in this respect was made by Lipsky (1968; see also Lipsky 1970 , Lipsky & Olson 1977 , who saw movements as strongly dependent on the activation of third parties to be successful in the long run. Schumaker (1975) arrived at a similar conclusion in his study of the responsiveness of political authorities to racial riots. On the other hand, third parties also include opponents, which might influence the oversimplified relationship between movements and the state and either prevent or facilitate their outcomes. Yet few authors have looked at the role of opponents (e.g. Barkan 1984 , Jasper & Poulsen 1993 , McAdam 1982 , Turk & Zucker 1984 . Following this perspective, the effectiveness of social movements depends on their capability to engage in bargaining activities with allies and opponents (Burstein et al 1995) .
The importance of political resources and institutions for movement outcomes has also been stressed by Jenkins & Perrow (1977) , who have suggested a link between changes in the political environment that offer social resources, on the one hand, and the rise and success of farm-worker insurgents, on the other hand. The conducive environment in their study is represented by the government and a coalition of liberal support organizations. Ultimately, they argue, the success of powerless insurgents is due to a combination of sustained outside support, the disunity of the political elites, and their tolerance, which provided the movement with crucial resources. Similarly, Piven and Cloward (1979) point to the important constraining role of institutions, which shape opportunities for action, model its forms, and limit its impact. They maintain that protest is more likely to have a real impact when challengers have a central role in institutions and when powerful allies have a stake in those institutions. Specifically, they view the electoral-representative system as a major factor mediating the political impact of institutional disruptions.
In line with this emphasis on political institutions, more recent work has begun to follow what I see as the most promising avenue of research on the out-comes of social movements: to carry on cross-national comparisons of movements and to examine one or more instances of a various array of their potential consequences in order to formulate plausible causal theories about the link between movement actions and those consequences. In so doing, one can assess the filtering role of the political context on movement outcomes. Following this perspective, Amenta et al (1992) have shown for the case of early social policy in the United States that the political mediation model, which places political opportunity structure as a mediating factor between social movements and their success, offers the best explanation. Ultimately, therefore, the state and the political party system determine whether social movements can win acceptance and new advantages.
Although attempts at comparing movement outcomes across countries are not new (e.g. Gurr 1983 , Kitschelt 1986 , Kowalewski & Schumaker 1981 , Midttun & Rucht 1994 , Riidig 1990 , there is still a huge void in the literature as opposed to case studies of single movements or countries. The best known of these cross-national studies is probably that of Kitschelt. In his influential comparison of the antinuclear movement in four western democracies (Kitschelt 1986), he makes a strong case for the structural determinants of social movement outcomes, arguing that the success of the antinuclear movement is strongly dependent on political opportunity structures. A more recent contribution elaborates on Kitschelt's model to show the crucial role of political opportunities in shaping the outcomes of Western European new social movements (Giugni 1995) . Hopefully, other scholars will soonjoin these efforts and carry on comparative studies on the outcomes and consequences of social movements.
SUCCESS, FAILURE, OUTCOMES, CONSEQUENCES
At this point, there is need for clarification of certain terms of our discussion.
So far, we have seen that a first strand of research has inquired into the internal and organizational characteristics of social movements that may help them to bring about (policy) outcomes and hence to become successful. A second strand has tried to put the movements in their larger social and political environment, in particular by examining the role of public opinion and political opportunity structures as intervening factors mediating the movement-outcome nexus. To do so, scholars have relied on various typologies of outcomes. The best known is certainly the one proposed by Gamson (1990) , who has defined success as a set of outcomes that fall into two basic clusters: the acceptance of a challenging group by its antagonists as a valid spokesman for a legitimate set of interests, and the gain of new advantages by the group's beneficiary during the challenge and its aftermath. By combining these two dimensions, the author has defined four possible outcomes of a challenge: 1. full response, 2. preemption, 3. co-optation, and 4. collapse. Unfortunately, this typology is not fully exploited in the empirical analyses, which remain for the most part confined to the two-fold distinction between acceptance and new advantages. I have lingered on Gamson's main findings earlier. What matters here is to see how his simple typology has influenced much subsequent research. In some way, on the other hand, it has also put some limits to research, for it brought the focus on the organizations instead of on the broader cycles of protest, which may include various movements whose combined effect might be more important than the impact of a single challenging group (Tarrow 1994) . Several authors have adopted the distinction between acceptance and new advantages or have given a revised version of it. Among the former are obviously those who have reanalyzed Gamson's original data (Frey et al 1992 , Goldstone 1980 , Mirowsky & Ross 1981 , Steedly & Foley 1979 ). Webb and several collaborators also built on Gamson's typology and work, but used a different dataset (Webb et al 1983) . Amenta et al (1992) , on the other hand, defined three levels of success in an attempt to elaborate on Gamson's typology: co-optation or the recognition from opponents or the state, gains in policies that aid the group, and the transformation of challengers into a member of the polity. Within each type, in addition, there are various degrees of success. Here, however, we begin to see the dangers entailed in the use of the notions of success and failure. First, such a perspective assumes that social movements are homogeneous and hence tends to attribute success or failure to an entire movement, unless one focuses on single organizations as Gamson did. Yet often there is little agreement among movement leaders and participants, even within a given organization, regarding which goal must be pursued. Second, as it is not always uniformly evaluated by everyone, success raises the question of subjectivity. Movement participants and external observers may have different perceptions of what counts as success, and the same action may be judged as successful by some participants and as failed by others. Finally, the notion of success is problematic because it overstates the intention of participants. Once again, while social movements are rational efforts to bring about change, many of their consequences are unintended and often unrelated to their claims.
These ambiguities notwithstanding, numerous scholars have looked at the determinants of movement success or failure (e.g. Amenta et al 1992, Banaszak 1996 , Brill 1971 , Burstein et al 1995 , Frey et al 1992 , Gamson 1990 , Goldstone 1980 , Mirowsky & Ross 1987 , Nichols 1987 , Perrot 1987 , Piven & Cloward 1979 , Shorter & Tilly 1971 , Steedly & Foley 1979 . Therefore, most of the existing typologies are framed, explicitly or implicitly, in terms of suc- Schumaker (1975) defined five criteria of government responsiveness to movement demands: access, agenda, policy, output, and impact. (c) Riidig (1990) used this typology in his comprehensive study of the antinuclear movement worldwide. (d) Burstein et al (1995) also relied on this typology, pointing out correctly that it addresses several aspects of the political process that had previously been left out. However, they added structural effects as a sixth type of government responsiveness, thus acknowledging that movement can provoke alterations in the institutional arrangements of society.
(e) Kitschelt (1986) also stressed structural effects, i.e. a transformation of the political structures, in addition to procedural effects (Gamson's acceptance) and substantive effects (Gamson's new advantages). This typology allows for a link between the outcomes of social movements and their political context. (/) In quite a similar way, Gurr (1980) had previously defined three types of outcomes of violent conflicts: effects on the group fate, policy changes, and societal or systemic effects. The advantage of this typology is that it makes a clear distinction between internal effects on the movement and external effects on policy or the larger society. (g) Kriesi (1995) added a further distinction to Kitschelt's typology by defining two types of substantive impact: reactive effects, i.e. the prevention of"new disadvantages," and proactive effects, i.e. the introduction of "new advantages." This distinction is relevant with regard to political opportunity structures, for it allows us to link social movement outcomes to the strength of the state and has been used to investigate the outcomes of Western European new social movements (Giugni 1995) . (h) Finally, Rucht (1992) acknowledged the need to distinguish between goal-related outcomes and broader consequences by classifying the effects of social movements according to two dimensions: internal vs external and intended vs unintended. Gurr's and Rochon & Mazmanian's typologies present a further advantage:
They acknowledge the possibility that different types of outcomes be related to each other. This is an important point. Gurr (1980) , for example, suggested that group changes and systemic changes be seen as ultimate outcomes that take place through policy changes, which, in turn, are the proximate result of violent conflicts (Gurr 1980) . Rochon & Mazmanian (1993) maintain that substantial gains may be more easily obtained once a challenging group has reached some degree of acceptance. Other authors have similarly explored how social movements can make a greater impact by pursuing goals in administrative agencies and courts once they have achieved policy responsiveness (e.g. Burstein 1985 , 1991 , Handler 1978 , Sabatier 1975 . A recent interesting variant has been proposed by Diani (1997) , who claims that when movements are able to facilitate the emergence of new social networks they will be more influential in processes of political and cultural change. Here, we abandon the classificatory terrain to begin to reason in terms of relationships between vari-ables. In other words, it is the beginning of a theory of movement outcomes. Unfortunately, very little research has been done to show how a certain type of impact can help to bring about another type. In this, however, we have another interesting avenue for future research. Several authors have stressed the methodological problems that have been preventing social scientists from systematically analyzing the consequences of the presence and action of social movements, including the problem of causal attribution, the problem of time reference and effect stability, the problem of movement goal adaptation, the problem of interrelated effects, and the problem of unintended and perverse effects (Rucht 1992 see further Giugni 1994 , Gurr 1980 , Snyder & Kelly 1979 . Although this is not the place to propose solutions to these and related methodological problems, it would perhaps help to point out a logical puzzle that lies uphill, the recognition of which would make the task of setting research agenda easier. It has to do with the blurring of some fundamental distinctions between types of potential effects of movements.
The vast majority of the existing studies deal with effects that are related to the movements' stated programs and ends. The Brent Spar case mentioned at the outset is a good example: A declared goal by a challenging group is reached, allegedly as a result (at least in part) of the group's actions. But only under exceptional circumstances do movement actions have such an immediate and successful impact. Most of the time, movements promote their programs cumulatively over months and even years of claim-making (C Tilly, 1998a) . This makes the analysis much more complicated. Yet most research has focused on outcomes of social movements, which we may define as a special case of the more general set of their consequences: those that relate directly to the goals and ends of challengers.
Even more narrowly, work on outcomes has usually looked at the impact of movements on government policy or legislation (e.g. Amenta et al 1992; Banaszak 1996; Burstein 1979a Burstein , 1985 Burstein & Freudenburg 1978; Button 1978 Button , 1989 Costain & Majstorovic 1994; Gelb 1989; Gelb and Palley 1987; Huberts 1989; MacDougal et al 1995) . Three only partly correct assumptions are perhaps at the origin of this strong focus on policy outcomes. First, the view held by the political process approach that social movements are essentially targeting political authorities and institutions and, hence, they are mainly aimed at provoking political change. While such a definition covers a crucial aspect of the national social movement and is widely adopted in the literature (McAdam et al 1996 , Tarrow 1994 , Tilly 1984 , contemporary movements often address the larger public, aiming, for example, to change attitudes and opinions on a given matter. In addition, other authors have warned us about the dangers of restricting our attention to the political side of new social movements, as they have identity-related goals that do not necessarily require a political target (Melucci 1996) . Second, and related to the first point, the eager-ness to find the causes of movement success or failure, an attitude facilitated by the activist past of many scholars and by a sympathetic stand toward many contemporary movements. Third, the conviction that policy changes are more easily measured than cultural changes. The latter reason would explain why we still have rather few studies on the cultural aspects of movements except for the individual-level consequences of participation in social movements and activism, on which there is a considerable body of literature (e.g. Abramowitz & Nassi 1981 , Demerath et al 1971 , Fendrich 1974 , 1977 , Fendrich & Krauss 1978 , Fendrich & Lovoy 1988 , Fendrich & Tarlau 1973 , Jennings 1987 , Jennings & Niemi 1981 , Marwell et al 1987 , McAdam 1988 , Nassi & Abramowitz 1979 , Whalen & Flacks 1980 .
To be sure, there is work on what may be seen as instances of the cultural impact of movements, such as their spillover effects from one movement to the other (Meyer & Whittier 1994) , their capacity to generate social capitals (Diani 1997) , their impact on the media (Gamson & Wolfsfeld 1993) , and so forth, but these are rather sporadic in comparison to the huge amount of works on policy outcomes. Other authors, on the other hand, have looked at the cultural determinants of movement success as measured through policy or legislative change (e.g. Banaszak 1996), thus reversing the causal arrow. Studying the ways in which social movements have their demands met is, of course, a legitimate endeavor that will help improve our knowledge of the causal processes involved in social and political change. Yet, like all kinds of actions, the effects of social movements are often indirect, unintended, and sometimes even in contradiction to their goals (on the unintended consequences of social action, see Tilly 1996) . Increased repression, for example, is often an immediate effect of protest, but the long-term consequences may be differenct (della Porta 1995). Tarrow (1989 Tarrow ( , 1993 Tarrow ( , 1994 goes precisely in this direction when he looks at the broad repercussions of cycles of protest, including cycles of reform. In his study of the Italian protest cycle of the 1960s and 1970s (Tarrow 1989) , the author shows that this period of disorder made a crucial impact and left a positive legacy for Italian democracy by promoting reform, expanding the political arena, giving autonomy to Italian voters, and, above all, expanding the repertoire of the legitimate forms of political participation. By analyzing social movements at the macro level, Tarrow established a link between two broad phenomena: the emergence, development, and decline of a cycle of protest, on the one hand, and political, institutional, and cultural changes, on the other hand, whereby the former plays a crucial role in bringing about the latter. The lesson to be drawn here is that both the shortterm and the long-term consequences of movement actions must be examined (Andrews 1997).
Empirical work that focuses explicitly on the unintended consequences of social movements is quite rare (e.g. Deng 1997 , Paul et al 1997 . Yet, as Charles Tilly (1998a) has put it, "this range of effects far surpasses the explicit demands made by activists in the course of social movements, and sometimes negates them. By any standard, 'success' and 'failure' hardly describe most of the effects." In addition, he maintains, third parties can act and produce changes in the zone of a movement's activities and interests. According to Tilly, the difficulties of analyzing the consequences of social movements arise precisely from this logical situation, which he has schematized as three overlapping circles. Analysts should take into consideration three sets of variables: 1. all movement claims, 2. all effects of movements' actions, and 3. all effects of outside events and actions. The overlapping of these three variables creates four situations that must be analytically distinguished. As Figure 1 shows, what I defined as outcomes, i.e. effects of movement actions that bear directly on movement claims, result from the overlapping of set 1 and 2. If the effects can be completely attributed to the movement's action, we can speak of success when they are positive and failure when they are negative (intersection A), although the problem of the differential evaluation of success remains. But at least a part of outcomes are produced as joint effects of movement actions and outside influences (intersection B). Furthermore, sometimes external events and actions may produce effects that satisfy movement claims (intersection C). Finally, we must take into account the possibility ofjoint effects of movement actions and outside influences that do not bear directly on movement claims, i.e. unintended consequences. Once we have posed the fundamental logical problem so nicely illustrated by Tilly, we will be in a better position to build causal theories about social movements, their success or failure, their outcomes, and the broader consequences of their actions.
CONCLUSION
As the review of the relevant literature reveals, much work on the impact of social movements and protest behavior was done during the seventies. The spark was provided by the wave of student and antiwar protest as well as the riots that occurred in American cities during the sixties. The latter, in particular, incited American scholars to inquire not only into the causes, but also the consequences of violent political behavior. European scholars, on the other hand, have usually privileged the broad processes that have led to the emergence of the new social movements, hence paying only little attention to their repercussions on society, especially in empirical research. Subsequently, the interest in the effects of movements has somewhat waned. It resurfaced recently, however. Two forthcoming collective volumes (M Giugni et al 1998a,b) and recently published works and ongoing studies, testify to this renewed interest in the consequences of social movements, which stems less from the need to understand current practices in society, such as riot behavior in urban settings, than from the willingness to fill an important gap in the social movement lit- Figure 1 The problem of identifying social movement outcomes erature. As such, it is less focused on those characteristics and features shown by the phenomena currently under way and more genuinely aimed at unveiling the processes and dynamics that allow movements to make an impact on different aspects of society. This alone gives us some reassurances that more attention will be paid in the future to crucial consequences of social movements previously neglected. I am referring in particular to their potential for influencing processes of broader cultural and institutional change.
An agenda for future research should focus on the comparative study of the outcomes and consequences of social movements. Comparisons between dif-ferent political contexts, different movements, and different periods will shed light over the causal dynamics involved in processes of social and political change. A promising way to do so is to adopt a historical comparative design aimed at analyzing concordances and differences in order to generate explanations. Specifically, we would have much to gain from conducting in-depth comparisons of different national cases and different movements over a relatively long period, thereby comparing interactions that allow distinct movements to have a given type of consequence in different countries. By analyzing movement consequences following a comparative design, in addition, we will be able to avoid the formulation of invariant models that serve so badly the need of social sciences (Tilly 1995) . In addition, as Tilly (1998a) has correctly put it, the study of the outcomes and consequences of social movements implies, and indeed requires, the analysis of movement interactions and dynamics. If we do not pay careful attention to such interactions and dynamics, the methodological problems I have pointed out will always render our analyses weak and our conclusions shaky. If we do not first clarify the dynamics that have led hundreds of thousands of people to challenge the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, we will hardly be able to establish whether those protests were instrumental in the dramatic changes that occurred and how. Similarly, if we do not first shed light on the interactions between Greenpeace activists, political elites and institutions, public opinion, and Shell's leaders, we will find it difficult to attribute the company's decision to destroy the Brent Spar oil rig to the environmentalists' outraged call for a boycott. After all, without interactions there are simply no outcomes or consequences.
